Exploring the nexus between banking sector reform and performance: evidence from newly acceded EU countries by Brissimis, S.N. et al.
BANK OF GREECE
EUROSYSTEM
Working Paper
Sophocles N. Brissimis
Manthos D. Delis
Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou
Exploring the nexus between banking 
sector reform and performance:
evidence from newly 
acceded EU countries
JUNE 2008WORKINKPAPERWORKINKPAPERWORKINKPAPERWORKINKPAPERWORKINKPAPER
73
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BANK OF GREECE 
Economic Research Department – Special Studies Division 
21, Ε. Venizelos Avenue 
GR-102 50 Αthens 
Τel: +30210-320 3610 
Fax: +30210-320 2432 
 
www.bankofgreece.gr 
 
 
 
Printed in Athens, Greece 
at the Bank of Greece Printing Works. 
All rights reserved. Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is 
permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. 
 
ISSN 1109-6691 
 
EXPLORING THE NEXUS BETWEEN BANKING SECTOR 
REFORM AND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NEWLY 
ACCEDED EU COUNTRIES 
 
 
Sophocles N. Brissimis 
Bank of Greece and University of Piraeus  
 
Manthos D. Delis 
Athens University of Economics and Business 
 
Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou 
Athens University of Economics and Business
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between banking sector reform 
and bank performance – measured in terms of efficiency, total factor productivity 
growth and net interest margin – accounting for the effects through competition and 
bank risk-taking. To this end, we develop an empirical model of bank performance 
and draw on recent econometric advances to consistently estimate it. The model is 
applied to bank panel data from ten newly acceded EU countries. The results indicate 
that both banking sector reform and competition exert a positive impact on bank 
efficiency, while the effect of reform on total factor productivity growth is significant 
only toward the end of the reform process. Finally, the effect of capital and credit risk 
on bank performance is in most cases negative, while it seems that higher liquid 
assets reduce the efficiency and productivity of banks.  
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1. Introduction 
Three interrelated determinants of bank performance standout prominently in the 
current theoretical and empirical debate, namely the financial reform process, the 
degree of competition and the risk-taking behavior of banks. At least two groups of 
studies involve these determinants, each aiming at different objectives. Both draw on 
an important paper by Keeley (1990), who argued that the deregulation of the US 
banking sector in the 1970s and 1980s increased competition and led to a reduction in 
monopoly rents and thus, through worsened performance, to a higher equilibrium risk 
of failure. The first group of studies followed Keeley’s paradigm in examining the 
relationship between deregulation, bank risk-taking and competition, yielding 
however rather conflicting results (e.g. Matutes and Vives, 2000; Bolt and Tieman, 
2004; Allen and Gale, 2004). The second approach, which is mainly empirical in 
nature, attempts to analyze directly whether deregulation has an impact on bank 
performance; yet, the findings of this group of studies too are rather contentious. 
Some conclude that deregulation boosts efficiency through operational savings, thus 
leading to a surge in productivity growth (e.g. Kumbhakar et al., 2001; Isik and 
Hassan, 2003). Others, however, find that deregulation has a negative effect on the 
performance of banks, as it stimulates a decline in productive efficiency and/or total 
factor productivity growth (see Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1996; Wheelock and Wilson, 
1999). 
In the present paper we combine these two approaches by focusing on how bank 
performance is affected by reforms in the banking sector, and the associated changes 
in the industry structure and the risk-taking behavior of banks. Differently phrased, 
we examine the relationship between performance, reform, competition and risk-
taking, where, given the sequence of the effects discussed above, bank performance 
may be interrelated with the risk-taking behavior of banks. To carry out such an 
analysis, we develop a two-stage empirical model that involves estimating bank 
performance in the first stage and assessing its determinants in the second.  
Our model draws on the recent econometric contributions of Simar and Wilson 
(2007) and Khan and Lewbel (2007). In particular, bank performance, measured in 
terms of productive efficiency (PE) and total factor productivity (TFP) growth, is 
derived via nonparametric techniques and then the scores obtained are linked to 
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reform,1 competition and bank risk-taking using bootstrapping techniques that 
account for the possible endogeneity between bank performance and risk. We opt for 
an application of this model to ten newly acceded EU countries, since the transition 
from centrally planned to market economies involved quite uniform institutional, 
structural and managerial changes in the relevant banking sectors.  
To shed more light on the reform-competition-risk-performance nexus, this study 
has a number of additional features. First, further to the two nonparametric measures 
of PE and TFP growth, we employ the net interest margin (NIM) as a measure of 
bank performance. Second, instead of using concentration indices to measure 
competition in the banking industry, we construct a yearly index of competition for 
each country following a non-structural methodology. Third, by utilizing bank-level 
data and the important research output on banking sector reforms of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), we are able to derive a direct 
relationship between the reform process and bank performance. The twelve years of 
data used (1994-2005) capture almost the entire course of the banking sector reform 
process in the countries examined. Finally, to analyze the risk-taking behavior of 
banks, we consider three categories of risk, namely credit, liquidity and capital risk. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the first stage of the econometric methodology that 
corresponds to the derivation of bank performance measures; it also discusses the 
determinants of bank performance to be used in the second stage. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results of the second stage analysis, and finally Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Brief literature review 
In an important contribution, Keeley (1990) provided both a theoretical 
framework and empirical evidence that the deregulation of the US banking sector led 
to an erosion of bank market power and consequently of the market value of their 
equity capital. In turn, this increased banks’ incentives to take on extra risk, thus also 
increasing the risk of failure. Keeley’s paper triggered a lively discussion about the 
channels through which bank performance, and hence the stability of the banking 
                                                 
1 We shall use the term “bank reform”, rather than “deregulation”, to describe the full set of 
developments in the banking sectors of these countries. 
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system, is affected following deregulation measures. Two different yet 
complementary strands of literature emerged. The first examines the relationship 
between deregulation, market power (competition) and bank risk-taking, and the 
second investigates the direct effect of deregulation on bank performance. 
Studies in the first strand have been mainly theoretical. Matutes and Vives (2000) 
confirmed Keeley’s results on the liabilities side of a bank’s balance sheet, while Bolt 
and Tieman (2004) reached similar conclusions by examining the assets side. 
Hellmann et al. (2000) suggested that bank regulation through capital requirements is 
not a Pareto optimal policy for controlling banks’ risk-taking incentives and proposed 
that such requirements should be combined with deposit rate controls. In a series of 
papers, Diamond and Rajan (e.g. 2000, 2001a) pointed out that the optimal bank 
capital structure trades off liquidity creation and costs of bank distress. Therefore, 
banks are fragile during episodes of aggregate liquidity shortages, in which case 
capital has a strategic role to play in preventing failure. However, more recent papers 
advocate that the relationship between competition and financial stability may in fact 
be nonnegative. Allen and Gale (2004), studying a variety of models, suggested a 
complex and multi-faceted link. Boyd et al. (2006) examined two theoretical models, 
the first pointing to a negative correlation between banks’ risk of failure and 
competition, and the second establishing the opposite result. The fact that the second 
model was verified empirically on the basis of large US and international samples 
implies that increased competition does not lead to unstable banking environments.2
The empirical investigation of the above models seems to face considerable 
difficulties in measuring both deregulation and market power, which may be an 
important reason for the many differences in the findings. The effect of deregulation 
is assessed either by dummy variables that correspond to important deregulation 
measures (e.g. Salas and Saurina, 2003) or by simply examining the behavior of bank 
performance during periods of deregulation. On the other hand, most studies, 
including Boyd et al. (2006), proxy competition by concentration ratios that in many 
aspects have proved to be poor measures of competition. Other indicators of 
competition/market power employed include Tobin’s q (used by Salas and Saurina, 
2003), the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic (used by Claessens and Laeven, 2004, and 
Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007) and the Lerner index (see e.g. Angelini and Cetorelli, 
                                                 
2 For a fuller review of this literature, see Boyd and De Nicolo (2005). 
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2003). However, with a few exceptions, this literature lacks a measure of market 
power that shows how competition evolves over time, and thus during the 
deregulation process.3  
As regards the second strand of the literature, numerous studies evaluate the direct 
impact of financial deregulation on bank performance without accounting for its 
effect through competition and risk-taking. Most of these studies measure bank 
performance by parametric or nonparametric estimates of bank efficiency and 
productivity. However, their empirical results are also rather controversial. For 
example, Berg et al. (1992) examined the performance of the Norwegian banking 
sector over the 1980s and found that in the pre-deregulation period productivity 
declined, whereas a rapid growth was observed in the post-deregulation period.4 
Kumbhakar et al. (2001) concluded that Spanish savings banks experienced 
efficiency losses during the deregulation period, while in the last few years of that 
period productivity was growing. Wheelock and Wilson (1999) examined both the 
efficiency and total factor productivity of US commercial banks in the 1984-1993 
period, when significant regulatory reforms were implemented. On the one hand, they 
acknowledged diminishing efficiency due to rapid technological change, while on the 
other hand they found that large banks experienced productivity growth.5 The 
discrepancies in the empirical findings may be due to the dissimilar measures of 
performance and samples used (the latter corresponding to different macroeconomic 
conditions and deregulation policies). Other parameters like the organizational form 
and the special features of the institutions may also have affected this relationship. 
While the above literature provides significant evidence on the relationship either 
between deregulation, market power and bank risk-taking, or between deregulation 
and bank performance, a study of all the links in the deregulation-bank performance 
                                                 
3 Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) derive country-specific H-
statistics, which they subsequently regress on a number of explanatory variables using cross-sectional 
estimation methods. However, some authors suggest that the H-statistic does not map into a range of 
oligopoly solution concepts as robustly as the Lerner index does. Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) 
recognize this and estimate Lerner indices for each year in the sample period, which are also regressed 
on a number of explanatory variables in a second stage of analysis, again using cross-sectional 
methods. Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) suggest a method that provides yearly estimates of market power 
for the Japanese banking sector, thus enabling the investigation of short-term changes in the degree of 
competition.  
4 The positive effect of deregulation on total factor productivity is also corroborated by the recent work 
of Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas (2005) for Spanish banks. 
5 Humphrey and Pulley examined the relationship between deregulation and bank performance in the 
1980s and early 1990s in the US and documented an initial decline in bank profits, with long-term 
adjustment being primarily due to changes in banks’ business environment.  
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chain is missing. A possible explanation is that such a study of bank performance 
would require a two-stage approach, where bank performance measures derived via 
parametric or nonparametric techniques in the first stage would be regressed  on a 
number of determinants reflecting deregulation, market power and risk. 
Unfortunately, it turns out that conventional two-stage procedures yield inconsistent 
results, and only very recently Simar and Wilson (2007) suggested a robust procedure 
for nonparametrically derived measures of performance. This will be used in our 
empirical analysis that follows. 
  
3.  Empirical analysis 
Given the theoretical considerations discussed in the previous section, we specify 
the following empirical model to study the relationship between performance, reform, 
competition and risk-taking in banking: 
0 1 2 3 4it t t it t itp a a ref a a x a m uθ= + + + + +                   (1) 
where the performance p of bank i at time t is written as a function of a time-
dependent banking-sector reform variable, ref; an index of banking industry market 
power, θ; a vector of bank-level variables representing credit, liquidity and capital 
risk, x; variables that capture the macroeconomic conditions common to all banks, m; 
and the error term u.  
The above model is estimated on a panel of banks from ten newly acceded EU 
countries (listed in Table 1), which corresponds to a relatively long period, covering 
the banking sector reform process in these countries, namely the 1994-2005 period. 
We choose to focus the empirical analysis on the unconsolidated statements of 
commercial, savings and cooperative banks in order to reduce the possibility of 
aggregation bias in the results. All bank-level data used are obtained from the 
BankScope database. During the sample period a number of M&As and bank failures 
took place, which are taken into account in our dataset so as to avoid selectivity bias. 
Also, the data were reviewed for reporting errors or other inconsistencies (zero or 
negative values for the variables used). This yielded an unbalanced panel dataset of 
4368 observations corresponding to 364 banks. All bank-level data are reported in 
 9
euros and are expressed in constant 1994 prices (using individual country GDP 
deflators). Below we discuss the variables used to estimate Eq. (1).  
 
3.1. Measurement of performance 
Bank performance is proxied alternatively by productive efficiency, total factor 
productivity growth and the net interest margin.  
Efficiency: This refers to the distance (in terms of production) of a decision-
making unit (DMU) from the best practice in the industry; it is given by a scalar 
measure ranging between zero (the lowest efficiency score) and one (corresponding 
to the optimum DMU). The literature on the measurement of efficiency follows two 
major approaches, using parametric and nonparametric frontiers, respectively.6
In the parametric frontier analysis, the technology of a DMU is specified in the 
context of a particular functional form for the cost, profit or production relationship 
that links the DMU’s output to inputs and, as the term “parametric” implies, includes 
a stochastic term. The literature uses various parametric frontier methods depending 
on the assumptions made about the error term (for more details, see Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). The nonparametric methods of efficiency measurement include the 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Free Disposal Hull (FDH). The most 
widely used is DEA, a programming technique that provides a linear piecewise 
frontier by enveloping the observed data points and yields a convex production 
possibilities set. As such, it does not require the explicit specification of the 
functional form of the underlying production relationship. In the context of the 
present analysis, the nonparametric efficiency estimates serve better as performance 
measures compared to their parametric equivalents. Indeed, regressing efficiency 
estimates obtained from parametric techniques would almost certainly result in 
problems of statistical consistency, since the covariates of Eq. (1) would be correlated 
with the fixed or random effects of the initial parametric regression (see Coelli et al., 
2005). In contrast, Simar and Wilson (2007) have provided a procedure for robustly 
regressing efficiency estimates derived from nonparametric techniques on a number 
                                                 
6 For a general introduction to these approaches, see Coelli et al. (2005). 
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of determinants.7 For this reason, we opt here for nonparametric estimates of 
efficiency, while the specifics of the estimation method of Eq. (1) are provided in the 
next section.     
Total factor productivity: Access to panel data provides the opportunity to exploit 
also the total factor productivity (TFP) growth of banks, again using nonparametric 
techniques. Analyzing the productivity of banks is of interest from a policy 
perspective, since increased productivity may contribute positively to the overall 
performance of the banking system, lower prices and improved service quality for 
consumers. In addition, enhanced productivity may act as a safety net against the 
various risks associated with the banking industry. To measure TFP change, we use 
standard Malmquist techniques.8 The most popular has been the DEA-like 
programming technique suggested by Fare et al. (1994), which is the one followed 
here. The Malmquist technique allows decomposition of TFP change into 
technological change (TC) and technical efficiency change (TEC). An improvement 
in TC is considered as a shift in the frontier.  Also, TEC is the product of scale 
efficiency change (SEC) and pure technical efficiency change (PTEC). Given this 
decomposition, the Malmquist index provides a powerful tool of analysis for the 
sources of TFP growth.9
The first problem encountered in evaluating bank efficiency and TFP growth is 
the definition and measurement of bank output. The two most widely used 
approaches are the ‘production’ and the ‘intermediation’ approaches.10 While we 
acknowledge that it would probably be best to employ both approaches to identify 
whether the results are biased when using a different set of outputs, sufficient data to 
perform such an analysis on banks from newly acceded EU countries is generally 
unavailable. Hence, this study uses the ‘intermediation approach’ for two main 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of the reasons why previous two-stage procedures using nonparametric estimates of 
efficiency lead to invalid inference, see Simar and Wilson (2007). 
8 To save space, we do not replicate the mathematical models here, and only provide the Malmquist 
formula in Appendix I. For a recent review of the literature on productivity change in banking, see 
Casu et al. (2004). 
9 This decomposition has been subject to a number of criticisms (see Casu et al., 2004), mainly in 
terms of the role of constant returns vs. variable returns to scale frontiers. However, there seems to be 
consensus that the Malmquist index is correctly measured by the constant returns to scale distance 
function even when technology exhibits variable returns to scale. 
10 Under the former approach, output is measured by the number of transactions or documents 
processed over a given time period (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Under the latter approach, 
output is measured in terms of values of stock variables (such as loans, deposits etc.) appearing in bank 
accounts. 
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reasons: first, this approach is inclusive of interest expenses, which usually account 
for over one-half of total costs, and second the BankScope database lacks the 
necessary data for implementing the production approach. Accordingly, we specify 
two outputs, namely total loans and total securities; and two inputs, i.e. operating 
expenses (non-interest and personnel expenses) and total deposits and short-term 
funding.11 Both inputs and outputs have risen considerably during the sample period 
due to M&As and the rapidly growing size of banking institutions (especially of the 
newly established foreign institutions) of the region (summary statistics are presented 
in Table 1). 
Given the above, we estimate PE and TFP change at the bank level for the ten 
countries of our sample, to obtain the Stage 1 estimation results (see Appendix for the 
technical details of the procedure used). Table 2 reports average estimates, denoted by 
pe and dtfp, by country and through time. We should bear in mind that the estimations 
are carried out for each country separately and therefore the efficiency scores only 
reflect the dispersion of efficiency within each sample, they tell us nothing about the 
efficiency of one sample relative to another.  
Almost all countries show a gradual improvement in their PE. This is not 
surprising, since the banking systems examined have seen fundamental changes in 
their ownership structure (private vs. public, foreign vs. domestically-owned banks), 
including mergers. In addition, the relatively stable macroeconomic conditions of the 
period, coupled with a significant improvement in operating expenses management, 
may have led to improved PE. The majority of banks comprising the sample seem to 
cluster around levels of efficiency of approximately 65%, which is a score similar to 
that found in other recent nonparametric analyses of Western European banking 
systems (see e.g. Casu and Molyneux, 2003). 
                                                 
11 The definition of inputs and outputs varies widely across studies of bank efficiency. In this paper, 
given the limitations of the BankScope database, further disaggregation of inputs and outputs is not 
possible (i.e. personnel expenses or fixed assets are not reported for many banks). Clearly, it is possible 
that the use of expenses rather than physical inputs could result in some bias against those banks that 
employ high-quality and therefore high-cost inputs. This potential bias should be mitigated, however, 
given that banks with high-quality inputs should expect to see some benefit in output terms. Hence, if 
high-quality inputs are sufficiently productive, such banks will not be disadvantaged from a relative 
efficiency perspective (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Drake and Hall, 2003). Also, some studies 
suggest that deposits have both input and output characteristics (e.g. Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
However, even this distinction of deposits is difficult, given the diversity of the banking systems 
examined. For the sake of comparison, total deposits are treated here as inputs.   
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Table 2 also reports the Malmquist TFP change index (dtfp). A value for dtfp 
greater than one indicates positive TFP growth, while a value less than one indicates a 
TFP decline. All countries present considerable TFP growth over the sample period, 
which is representative of banking sectors under intense reform. In particular, average 
TFP growth has been as large as 28.6% and 26.1% in Poland and the Czech Republic, 
respectively. Even countries like Slovenia and Latvia, which present the lowest TFP 
growth in their banking systems among the countries examined (7.6% and 9.1%, 
respectively), exhibit relatively high TFP growth scores compared with those reported 
by other studies for developed banking systems (e.g. Casu et al., 2004).  
For expositional brevity, we do not present all the individual components of TFP 
growth. However, it seems that the most important element of dtfp is TC, especially 
in the case of dtfp increases. Again, this is an expected result for banking sectors in 
rapid transition. To illustrate this result, in Figures 1 and 2 we present bivariate kernel 
regressions of TC and PTEC on dtfp, respectively.12 In both cases, we use the 
Epanechnikov kernel, which is the most commonly used in the relevant studies, and a 
small bandwidth (equal to 0.2) that provides detailed information regarding the shape 
of the examined relationships. Both figures indicate positive relationships between 
dtfp and its two sources; however, the dtfp-TC locus is steeper, especially for higher 
values of dtfp, which is indicative of the greater importance of TC as a source of TFP 
growth relative to PTEC, particularly for higher values of dtfp. 
Net interest margin: Along with the nonparametric measures of bank performance 
discussed so far, we also employ the net interest margin (NIM). NIM represents the 
amount by which the interest earned on a bank’s portfolio exceeds the interest paid on 
deposits or borrowed funds. In the literature, NIM has emerged as a key indicator of 
asset productivity, since a high NIM is indicative of the effective use of earning assets 
and a sensible mix of interest-bearing liabilities.13
 
 
                                                 
12 Here we follow Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007), who suggest using the nonparametric kernel regressions 
to explain the nonparametric efficiency scores on the basis of various determinants. These are less 
powerful techniques in terms of prediction, yet they are extremely informative for explanatory 
purposes. 
13 Recent studies that examine the determinants of NIM include Saunders and Schumacher (2000) and 
Maudos and de Guevara (2004). A potential weakness of NIM may be that, as banks move toward 
more fee-generating activities, NIM will decline in importance as a measure of asset profitability. 
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3.2. Determinants of bank performance 
3.2.1. Banking sector reform 
Banking system restructuring was quite profound over the last decade in most of 
the countries of our sample. Since the mid-1990s, their banking systems were 
extensively reformed through the abolition of administrative interventions and 
regulations, which seriously hampered their development. The reforms were adopted 
gradually and supported the further improvement of the institutional framework and 
the more competent functioning of banks and financial markets in general. The 
objective of these countries’ enetring the EU prompted efforts to further deregulate 
their banking systems and achieve macroeconomic convergence. During the past few 
years, banks tried to strengthen their position in the domestic market and acquire a 
size, partly through M&As, that would allow them to exploit economies of scale and 
have easier access to international financial markets. 
Banks operating in the countries examined are gradually reaching the standards of 
their counterparts in the rest of EU countries. The institutional reforms briefly 
described above have been viewed as a means to reduce bank costs, particularly those 
associated with risk management and the evaluation of credit information. However, 
for smaller and private domestic banks, risk management techniques need to improve 
further (see EBRD, 2006). In fact, lending in emerging markets is greatly influenced 
by how banks perceive the legal environment and the level of hedging against risks 
that this environment entails. Institutional improvements, such as effective systems 
for taking collateral and recovering assets in cases of default, will play a fundamental 
role in the further development of the banking sector. However, given the 
restructuring that took place in the last decade, the newly acceded EU countries 
provide an excellent case for the study of the relationship between performance, 
reform, competition and risk-taking.14  
Data on the banking reform process are obtained from the EBRD. In particular, 
we use the EBRD index of banking sector reform, either as a structural index (ebrd) 
(see Table 1 for summary statistics) or to generate time dummy variables. This index 
has been compiled by the EBRD with the primary purpose of assessing the progress 
                                                 
14 For a detailed review of the reform process in the Central and Eastern European countries’ financial 
sectors, see various issues of the EBRD Transition Reports (e.g. Transition Report 2006: Finance in 
transition). 
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of the banking sectors of formerly centrally planned economies. As this indicator 
quantifies and qualifies the degree of liberalization of the banking industry, it is 
suitable for an explicit evaluation of the effect of banking sector reform on the 
performance of banks. Related studies measure the impact of deregulation (or specific 
deregulation policies) on bank performance or competition; they do not focus on the 
reform process as a whole.15 The values of ebrd range from 1.0 to 4.0+, with 1.0 
indicating a rigid centralized economy and 4.0+ implying the highest level of reform, 
which corresponds to a fully industrialized market economy. The criteria used for the 
compilation of the index are common to all countries (see EBRD Transition Reports, 
various issues). When the index is used to formulate dummy variables, we assume 
that changes in the regulatory regime remain over time, and thus the (country-
specific) dummies take a value of one in the year of change and remain equal to one 
until the end of the sample period. Obviously, the reform process, when thus treated, 
is viewed as permanent in that it affects banks not only in the year of change in the 
regulatory regime, but also in all subsequent years of the sample period (see Salas and 
Saurina, 2003). The upward trend of the index reflects the extensive restructuring that 
took place in the banking sectors examined during the sample period. 
 
3.2.2. Bank competition 
To measure the evolution of competitive conditions over time in the banking 
systems of the ten newly acceded EU countries, we use the methodology suggested 
by Uchida and Tsutsui (2005). In particular, we jointly estimate the following system 
of three equations that correspond to a translog cost function, to a revenue equation 
obtained from the profit maximization problem of banks and to an inverse loan 
demand function: 
2 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9
1 1 1ln ln (ln ) ln (ln ) ln (ln )
2 2 2
            (ln )(ln ) (ln )(ln ) (ln )(ln )
it it it it it it it
C
it it it it it it it
C b b q b q b d b d b w b w
b q w b q d b d w e
= + + + + + + +
+ + +
2
                                                
 
 
15 For instance, Salas and Saurina (2003) and Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas (2005) employ all the 
deregulation events that occurred in the period under examination to capture the deregulation process 
in the Spanish banking industry. Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) measure deregulation through changes 
in minimum capital requirements, or the abrogation of the interest rate ceilings policy. Similarly, 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) choose foreign bank penetration to capture deregulation. Other studies 
also use the abolition of entry restrictions as a deregulation proxy (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004). 
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        ( ln ln ln )
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t
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d
θ
η= + + + + +
+ + + +
+
                (2) 
0 1 2ln (1/ ) ln ln ln
D
it t it t t itp g q g gdpg g ir eη= − + + +  
where C is the total cost of bank i  at time t, q is bank output, d are deposits, w are 
bank inputs other than deposits, R is bank revenue, r is the interest rate on deposits, p 
is the price of bank output and e’s are the error terms. Variables with bars are defined 
as deviations from their cross-sectional means in each time period, so as to remove 
their trend. The variables gdpg and ir are exogenous variables that affect demand. 
The degree of competition in each year is given by θ, which represents the well-
known conjectural variations elasticity of total industry output with respect to the 
output of the ith bank.  
The range of possible values of θ is given by [0, 1]. In the special case of Cournot 
competition, θit is simply the market share of the ith bank. In the case of perfect 
competition, θit = 0; under pure monopoly, θit = 1; and, finally, θit < 0 implies pricing 
below marginal cost and could result, for example, from a non-optimizing behavior of 
banks. Note that in system (2) we dropped the subscript i on θ in order to capture the 
industry average degree of competition (on this point, see also Bresnahan, 1989). 
Both θ and η, which represents the market demand elasticity for bank output, are 
parameters to be estimated. To estimate θ, we use year dummy variables, while to 
estimate η, we use dummy variables for every two years.16 A merit of this estimation 
method is that it provides an index of industry market power to be used in subsequent 
analysis. 
Data for the bank-level variables are taken from BankScope and data for the 
control variables are taken from the EBRD’s Transition Reports and the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Specifically, C is measured by total 
expenses, q by total earning assets, d by total deposits and short-term funding, w by 
the ratio of total operating expenses to total assets, R by total revenue, r by the ratio 
of interest expenses to total deposits and short-term funding, p by the ratio of total 
                                                 
16 Τo estimate η we cannot use year dummy variables, because they are linearly dependent on the time-
specific control variables m. 
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revenue to total earning assets, gdpg by the annual % GDP growth rate and ir by a 
short-term interest rate.17
Estimation is carried out for each country separately using seemingly unrelated 
regression. For expositional brevity, only the average results for each country are 
presented in Table 3.18 The picture presented by the estimates is mixed, with some 
countries showing evidence of fairly competitive practices (e.g. Bulgaria and 
Romania), others exhibiting anticompetitive behavior (Lithuania and Slovenia) and 
most lying in between. Changes over time also differ across countries, yet there 
seems to be convergence toward middle values for θ. 
   
3.2.3. Bank risk-taking 
To capture the effect of risk in the second-stage regressions, we differentiate 
between three different types of risk, namely credit, liquidity and capital risk. Poor 
asset quality (increased credit risk) and low levels of liquidity are the two major 
causes of bank failures. During periods of increased uncertainty, financial institutions 
may decide to diversify their portfolios and/or raise their liquid holdings in order to 
reduce their risk. Banks would therefore improve their performance by improving 
screening and monitoring of both liquidity and credit risk, and such policies involve 
the forecasting of future levels of risk. On the other hand, increased levels of capital 
(lower capital risk) act as a safety net in the case of adverse developments and 
therefore are expected to have a positive impact on bank performance.19 Following 
the empirical literature, we use the ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans (cr) to 
measure credit risk, the ratio of liquid to total assets (lq) to proxy liquidity risk and 
the ratio of total equity to total assets (cap) to proxy capital risk. Table 1 reports all 
the bank-level risk variables used, along with some descriptive statistics, which show 
gradual convergence with European practice. In particular, all three ratios gradually 
                                                 
17 The short-term interest rate used varies between countries (e.g. in some countries we use the 
interbank rate, in others the central bank rate, etc.). Since estimation is carried out for each country 
separately, this is not a potential problem. 
18 The full set of θt results is available upon request. Several robustness checks were performed (e.g. 
estimation using three-stage least squares), but the results remained unchanged at the 10% level of 
significance. Also, we used some risk variables (i.e. capital and/or credit risk) as inputs in the cost and 
revenue equations, yet again the results remained unchanged, with the exception of Romania (15% rise 
in θ) and Slovenia (10% fall).   
19 Most studies find a negative relationship between liquidity or credit risk and performance measures 
(e.g. Athanasoglou et al., forthcoming). As regards the capital-performance relationship, Berger (1995) 
suggests a positive correlation, which is mainly due to market imperfections.  
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decline, even though they are still far off the quality levels proposed by CAMEL 
analysis (below 1% for cr, 20-30% for lq and 5-8% for cap).20  
 
3.2.4. Control variables 
Finally, following the literature, the second-stage analysis includes some 
macroeconomic country-specific variables (m), namely the ratio of total investment to 
GDP (invgdp) as a proxy for fluctuations in economic activity, and a short-term 
interest rate (ir), which captures the variability of market interest rates. These 
variables are taken from the EBRD and the WDI. In addition to the macroeconomic 
variables, we also use foreign (for) and public (pub) ownership as potential 
determinants of bank performance.  
 
4. Results and sensitivity analysis 
4.1. Econometric procedure 
The previous sections provided some hints about the estimation methodology for 
Eq. (1). As Simar and Wilson (2007) point out, DEA efficiency estimates are serially 
correlated, and consequently standard approaches to inference (such as censored 
regressions) are invalid. In fact, Simar and Wilson propose that bootstrap procedures 
be used in the second-stage regressions that allow for valid inference.21 Yet, the 
theoretical considerations of Keeley (1990) and the debate that followed imply that 
performance and risk-taking in banking may be endogenous variables. To this end, 
we follow the methodology put forth by Khan and Lewbel (2007), who suggested a 
two-stage least squares estimation of truncated regression models. Their simulation 
results show that their new estimator performs well, while they explicitly state that 
their method is applicable in general contexts involving two-stage analyses with a 
nonparametric first step, such as ours. In what follows, we discuss the results obtained 
from estimating Eq. (1) using a procedure that combines the implications of Simar 
                                                 
20 CAMEL analysis provides a framework for the evaluation of banks through the complete coverage 
of the factors affecting bank creditworthiness. It has emerged as the industry standard. The factors 
covered in this framework are capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity. In a 
nutshell, the acronym to remember is CAMEL. 
21 In another paper, Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) acknowledge this drawback and suggest bivariate 
kernel regressions in the second stage. To our knowledge, no other study uses either the Simar and 
Wilson (2007) or the Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) methodology.  
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and Wilson (2007) and Khan and Lewbel (2007). The technical details of the 
estimation procedure are presented in the Appendix. 
 
4.2. Estimation results 
Table 4 presents the stage 2 results, using pe, dtfp or nim as the dependent 
variable. Note that for the regressions for pe and dtfp (columns 1-4) we use the 
algorithm in the Appendix.  The regressions in columns 5 and 6 correspond to a panel 
two-stage least squares estimation (to account for the endogeneity of the risk 
variables). For all dependent variables we report estimates based on the EBRD index 
used as an ordinal index (ebrd), as well as on the reform dummies (ref94-ref05). In 
the dtfp equations we use the change in each explanatory variable (denoted by a d in 
front of the variable), since dtfp also reflects change. The rest of the variables used 
are common in all regressions: market power (mp), the three risk variables (cap, lq, 
cr), the two control variables (ir, invgdp) and two dummy variables that capture 
foreign (for) and public (pub) ownership. 
The results in column 1 show substantial gains in productive efficiency following 
the reforms, as most of the coefficients on the reform dummies are positive and 
statistically significant. The largest and most significant change is reported for 2005. 
Reform measures taken in 1995, 1999, 2002 and 2004 had no significant effect on 
efficiency, while a significantly negative impact is documented for 1998 and 2001. In 
spite of these non-significant and/or negative changes, the positive impact that reform 
has on bank efficiency is dominant.22 An overall positive relationship is confirmed by 
the coefficient on ebrd (see column 2). 
Column 3 shows that the relationship between dtfp and the reform dummies is in 
most cases insignificant except for the last two years, when the relevant effect turned 
positive and significant, reflecting the fact that the productivity of banks gained 
momentum in 2004 and 2005. These results are similar to those of Isik and Hassan 
(2003), who find that Turkish banks have experienced a positive growth of 
productivity only in the last years of the financial deregulation process.23 This 
                                                 
22 The empirical results of Salas and Saurina (2003) support this argument. By regressing market 
power on a series of different liberalization measures, they reached similar conclusions. 
23 Our findings are also similar to those of Berg et al. (1992), who report noticeable productivity 
growth for Norwegian banks only in the post-deregulation period. 
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phenomenon may be attributed to the longer-term nature of the effect of technological 
improvements. When ebrd is employed in the regression (column 4), a positive link 
between reform and dtfp is documented, possibly driven by the last years of our 
sample, when countries reached higher levels of reform. In addition, the liberalization 
of banking sectors and the subsequent relaxation of regulatory conditions resulted in 
lower interest margins, as is evident from the negative relationship between nim and 
ebrd. A number of theoretical and empirical studies have reached the same 
conclusion (see e.g. Keeley, 1990; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004). 
While the above results clearly indicate that the reform process led to increased 
efficiency, and later to improved TFP growth, they only provide us with a hint 
concerning the channels involved. An important element in this transmission process 
is market power. Even though competition was not significantly enhanced (see Table 
3), its relationship with pe and nim is negative and positive, respectively.24 This 
suggests that banks, in the light of falling net interest margins and stable competition, 
strive for efficiency to improve their performance. The fact that competition does not 
affect productivity change significantly may suggest that the negative effect of mp on 
pe is offset by a positive relationship between mp and TC. This would imply that 
banks with market power are leaders in technology innovation.25
According to the traditional view, which can be traced back to Keeley’s (1990) 
work, deregulation in banking leads to intensified competition. Competition, in turn, 
erodes interest and profit margins and hence the charter value of banks; having less to 
lose, banks engage in riskier activities. As a result, the quality of loans deteriorates, 
enhancing banks’ risk of failure.26 Boyd and de Nicolo (2006) challenged the 
dominance of this view by showing that banks’ probability of failure as well as bank 
profits are positively related to concentration.27 Here we differentiate between 
different measures of risk to provide a clear picture of how risk management affects 
                                                 
24 For a recent study of the determinants of the net interest margin with similar results to those 
presented here, see Maudos and de Guevara (2004). 
25 We have additionally included a three-bank concentration ratio among the regressors to capture the 
effect of industry concentration. However, the results showed that concentration is always an 
insignificant determinant of bank performance, regardless of the measure of performance employed 
and even when mp is not included in the estimated equation (nevertheless, the correlation between mp 
and concentration is as low as 0.1). These results are available upon request. 
26 In line with this view, Bolt and Tieman (2004) show that competition leads banks to relax their 
credit standards in order to attract more assets. 
27 By the same token, Chen (2007) provides evidence of increased screening activity due to intensified 
competition that leads to higher loan quality and hence to a reduction in the risk of failure. 
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bank performance. The results regarding capital and liquidity risk are uniform across 
all estimated equations, indicating a positive and a negative relationship, respectively. 
The latter result is new in the literature and requires some additional comments. 
Traditionally, banks have been solving the liquidity problem by holding cash together 
with a considerable amount of short-term government securities that they could sell 
for cash. On the other hand, a lower leverage ratio would imply a lower insolvency 
risk. Financial reform, however, led to the development of new banking products and 
alternative sources of funds for banks, which have made it easier for banks to secure 
liquidity.28 The above discussion implies that banks in the newly acceded EU 
countries should restructure their balance sheets by raising their capital base and 
reducing their holdings of liquid assets.29 Furthermore, this may suggest a strategic 
role for bank capital in cases of liquidity shortages (see Diamond and Rajan, 2001a; 
2001b). 
Concerning credit risk, the regression results reveal a significantly negative 
relationship with efficiency and TFP change. This shows that the banks of the 
countries examined should focus more on credit risk management, which has proved 
problematic in the recent past. Serious banking problems have arisen from the failure 
of banks to recognize impaired assets and create reserves for writing off these assets. 
A considerable help toward smoothening these anomalies would be provided by 
improving the transparency of the financial systems, which in turn would assist banks 
to evaluate credit risk more effectively and avoid problems associated with hazardous 
exposure. Finally, as columns 5 and 6 report, cr is not a significant determinant of 
nim. This may reflect the failure of net interest margin to capture the increasing 
importance of fee-generating activities.  
Regarding the ownership variables, the results are as expected. In particular, we 
find that banks with public ownership are less efficient and fall behind in their TFP 
growth rates. Also, foreign entry reduces nim, while public banks do not seem to have 
higher margins.30 Finally, as regards the effect of the macroeconomic control 
                                                 
28 In light of the recent turmoil in financial markets, this result may be viewed as conjuctural, because 
during our sample period markets were working well and so liquidity was never a problem.  
29 Such a result may have similar implications as those of Hellman et al. (2000), who find that capital 
requirements on their own do not lead to Pareto optimality.  
30 Foreign banks improve efficiency by about 0.3% relative to domestic private banks. Analogous is 
the deterioration of NIM. The presence of public banks reduces efficiency by 0.2% and productivity by 
1.2% the highest compared to domestic private banks. 
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variables on bank performance, we find a positive and significant relationship 
between pe and ir, and a marginally significant one with invgdp. Furthermore, the 
short-term interest rate has a negative and significant effect on productivity growth, 
while no such effect is found for invgdp. Concerning the link between nim and the 
control variables, no significant relation could be found. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper introduced a new empirical model into the study of bank performance. It 
combined two strands of literature: one mainly theoretical that studies the relationship 
between financial deregulation, banking industry competition and risk-taking of 
banks, and an empirical one that studies the evolution of bank performance during 
periods of financial deregulation. The rapid and quite uniform transition of newly 
acceded EU countries from centrally planned to market economies provides an 
obvious case study of the nexus between banking sector reform and performance. 
Given the two strands of literature, a special role in this nexus is played by banking 
industry competition and bank risk-taking behavior. 
In a first set of results, we provided a wide range of estimates of bank efficiency, 
TFP growth and banking industry competition by country and through time. These 
results indicate that, on average, efficiency and TFP have been improving, while the 
competitive conditions in the banking systems examined have been subject only to 
small changes. Subsequently, we used these results to analyze the nexus between 
banking sector reform and performance. By drawing on two recent econometric 
contributions by Simar and Wilson (2007) and Khan and Lewbel (2007), we have 
been able to show that banking sector reform has a positive effect on bank efficiency, 
which is partly channeled through the effects of competition and risk-taking of banks. 
Also, TFP growth has gained ground toward the end of the reform process, capturing 
the longer-term effects of technological improvements. Finally, the effect of capital 
and credit risk on bank performance is usually negative, while increased liquid assets 
seem to reduce bank performance. This latter finding implies that bank capital may 
have a strategic role in cases of liquidity shortages and increased credit risk.  
The approach followed in this paper may have considerable potential as a tool for 
further exploring various determinants of bank performance, for the purpose of 
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suggesting optimal bank management policies. A possible area for future research 
could be to provide a more detailed analysis of the different country-specific 
institutional characteristics that may affect bank performance and, more broadly, the 
financial stability of emerging markets.  
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Appendix 
Here we describe the methodology of estimation and inference in two-stage semi-
parametric models of production processes, building on Simar and Wilson (2007). In 
the first stage, we employ input-oriented DEA31 to measure variable returns to scale 
PE, as well as the Malmquist index to measure TFP change. In the second stage, we 
describe a double bootstrap procedure that accounts for the endogeneity between 
bank performance and risk-taking.  
Stage 1: Let us assume that for N observations there exist M inputs producing S 
outputs. Hence, each observation n uses a nonnegative vector of inputs denoted 
1 2( , ,..., )
n n n n
m
Mx x x x R+= ∈
S∈
 to produce a nonnegative vector of outputs, 
denoted . Production 
technology  describes the set of feasible input-output 
vectors and the input sets of production technology 
1 2( , ,..., )
n n n n
Sy y y y R+=
{( , ) :  can produce y}F y x x=
( ) { : ( , ) }L y x y x F= ∈  describe 
the sets of input vectors that are feasible for each output vector (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000).  
To measure variable returns to scale PE, we use the following input-oriented DEA 
model, where the inputs are minimized and the outputs are held at their current levels: 
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31 DEA may be computed either as input- or output-oriented. Input-oriented DEA shows by how much 
input quantities can be reduced without varying the output quantities produced. Output-oriented DEA 
assesses by how much output quantities can be proportionally increased without changing the input 
quantities used. The two measures provide the same results under constant returns to scale, but give 
slightly different values under variable returns to scale. Nevertheless, both output- and input-oriented 
models will identify the same set of efficient/inefficient DMUs. The variable vs. constant returns to 
scale option has no influence on the results, since both are used to calculate the various distances 
needed to construct the Malmquist indexes. For a more detailed discussion of the above, see Coelli et 
al. (2005). 
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where bank0 represents one of the N banks under evaluation, and xi0 and yr0 are the ith 
input and rth output for bank0, respectively. If θ* = 1, then the current input levels 
cannot be proportionally improved, indicating that bank0 is on the frontier. Otherwise, 
if θ* < 1, then bank0 represents an inefficient bank and θ* represents its input-oriented 
efficiency score. Finally, λ is the activity vector denoting the intensity levels at which 
the S observations are conducted. Note that this approach, through the convexity 
constraint 1λΣ =  (which accounts for variable returns to scale), forms a convex hull 
of intersecting planes, since the frontier production plane is defined by combining 
some actual production planes. 
As regards estimation of TFP change, we follow Fare et al. (1994), who defined 
the Malmquist index as 
1/ 2
0 0
0
0 0
( , ) ( , )( , , , ) x
( , ) ( , )
s t
t t t t
s s t t s t
s s s s
d y x d y xM y x y x
d y x d y x
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
               (2a) 
where M0 measures the productivity change between periods s (base period) and t, 
and   represents the distance from the period t observation to the period s 
technology. M
0 ( , )
s
t td y x
0>1 indicates positive TFP growth from period s to period t, M0<1 
indicates a decline and M0=1 indicates constant TFP growth. 
 Stage 2: Here we present the algorithm used to obtain estimates on a number of 
endogenous explanatory factors of PE and TFP change. This is performed by 
combining the algorithm suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) with the two-stage 
least squares truncated regression model put forth by Khan and Lewbel (2007), so as 
to account for the endogeneity of the risk variables. We consider all observations as 
cross-sections and therefore drop subscript t in Eq. (1). The algorithm is as follows: 
1. Obtain maximum likelihood estimates ˆkα  of kα  and uσ  of uσ  in the two-stage 
least squares truncated regression of ˆ ip  on its k determinants (zi) in Eq. (1), where 
ˆ ip ≤ 1. As instruments, we use the lags of the risk variables and the current and lagged 
values of the reform variable. This reflects the sequence of the effects that 
characterize the relationship between banking sector reform and performance, as 
described in Section 2. 
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2. Loop over the next three steps L=2000 times to obtain a set of bootstrap 
estimates * *
1
ˆ ˆ( , )
L
i u b b
α σ =⎡ ⎤Β = ⎣ ⎦ : 
2.1 For each i=1,…,m, draw ui from the 2ˆ(0, )uN σ distribution with left-truncation 
at . For details on how to draw from a left-truncated normal distribution, see 
the Appendix of Simar and Wilson (2007). 
ˆ(1 )iz a−
2.2 Again for each i=1,…,m, compute * ˆi ip z uα i= + . 
2.3 Use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the endogenous truncated 
regression of  on , yielding estimates *ip iz
* *,µ νµ ν . 
3.  Use the bootstrap values in B and the original estimates α , uσ  to construct 
estimated confidence intervals for each element of α  and for uσ . This is done by 
using the jth element of each bootstrap value *αˆ  to find values * *,π πµ ν  such that 
* *ˆ ˆPr ( ) 1j jπ πν α α µ π⎡− ≤ − ≤ ≈ −⎣ ⎤⎦ , for some small conventional value of π , 0.05π =  
in the present analysis. The approximation improves as . Substituting L→∞ * *,π πµ ν  
for ,π πµ ν  in ˆPr ( ) 1j jπ πν α α µ π⎡− ≤ − ≤ = −⎣ ⎤⎦
)
 leads to an estimated confidence 
interval * *ˆ ˆ( ,j jπ πα µ α ν+ + .  
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Table 1a  
Descriptive statistics (in thousand euros) 
   Country Deposits Operating
expenses 
Loans Securities Nim cap lq cr ebrd
Bulgaria          369543 40119 173574 52388 6.996 0.172 0.345 0.090 2.834
 1153297 114744 508450 194806 6.737 0.157 0.207 0.147  
Czech 
Republic 
826647         64813 245522 471046 5.984 0.149 0.415 0.071 3.362
 2333851 188499 615576 2242569 1.195 0.148 0.225 0.100  
Estonia          148847 15193 83598 14177 6.727 0.201 0.470 0.066 3.501
  249862 34126 184138 39222 8.790 0.162 0.200 0.193 
Hungary          261343 20341 150198 41739 5.137 0.134 0.397 0.022 3.667
 687891 40828 448350 199562 4.086 0.123 0.233 0.134  
Latvia          221715 19882 143328 54074 5.592 0.201 0.413 0.023 3.223
  648897 44016 466209 165898 4.579 0.193 0.235 0.038 
Lithuania          119094 9898 74679 49512 5.731 0.159 0.467 0.037 3.028
 317985 17398 252820 184244 6.682 0.129 0.228 0.100  
Poland          133195 18825 81301 32103 5.286 0.172 0.373 0.054 3.248
  696864 46525 368764 273076 6.155 0.177 0.216 0.098 
Romania          365849 19960 183360 90259 5.320 0.161 0.389 0.071 2.696
 967780 41214 542599 375642 4.493 0.126 0.212 0.082  
Slovakia          316425 23273 103444 118123 5.695 0.157 0.345 0.067 3.029
 1027710 55965 316492 835073 5.934 0.247 0.235 0.078  
Slovenia          389928 31450 352859 71019 5.313 0.151 0.383 0.038 3.193
 1190925 69622 1473242 273222 4.760 0.117 0.219 0.066  
Average          322426 28353 161132 101472 5.739 0.164 0.392 0.054 3.178
 1130051 88261 621520 813899 6.808 0.162 0.223 0.094  
Note: The first number in each cell is the mean and the second is the standard deviation of the variable. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Productive efficiency and total factor productivity change (annual means)   
Country Year pe dtfp Country Year pe dtfp 
Bulgaria 1994 0.652  Lithuania 1994 0.751  
 1995 0.701 1.362   1995 0.675 1.010 
 1996 0.754 1.255   1996 0.655 0.914 
 1997 0.726 1.210   1997 0.382 0.944 
 1998 0.686 1.117   1998 0.394 1.013 
 1999 0.621 0.882   1999 0.377 1.767 
 2000 0.767 1.740   2000 0.565 1.021 
 2001 0.727 0.960   2001 0.767 1.186 
 2002 0.753 1.224   2002 0.744 1.090 
 2003 0.703 1.070   2003 0.853 0.925 
 2004 0.681 1.025   2004 0.865 1.126 
 2005 0.763 1.548   2005 0.841 1.149 
 Average  0.711 1.218   Average  0.656 1.104 
Czech Republic 1994 0.376  Poland 1994 0.682  
 1995 0.490 1.255   1995 0.663 0.975 
 1996 0.726 1.244   1996 0.566 0.870 
 1997 0.784 1.287   1997 0.575 1.176 
 1998 0.663 1.627   1998 0.680 1.493 
 1999 0.606 1.271   1999 0.696 0.963 
 2000 0.568 1.251   2000 0.588 1.825 
 2001 0.451 1.411   2001 0.487 1.484 
 2002 0.410 1.081   2002 0.416 1.547 
 2003 0.327 1.050   2003 0.456 1.210 
 2004 0.340 1.210   2004 0.489 1.249 
 2005 0.449 1.184   2005 0.592 1.357 
 Average  0.516 1.261   Average  0.574 1.286 
Estonia 1994 0.691  Romania 1994 0.761  
 1995 0.716 1.167   1995 0.747 0.961 
 1996 0.786 1.028   1996 0.766 1.283 
 1997 0.781 1.182   1997 0.732 1.305 
 1998 0.707 1.010   1998 0.732 1.796 
 1999 0.768 1.086   1999 0.757 1.009 
 2000 0.697 0.975   2000 0.716 0.996 
 2001 0.789 1.362   2001 0.724 1.113 
 2002 0.853 1.096   2002 0.796 1.207 
 2003 0.765 1.147   2003 0.793 1.367 
 2004 0.830 0.821   2004 0.744 1.276 
 2005 0.898 1.165   2005 0.825 0.874 
 Average  0.773 1.094   Average  0.758 1.199 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Country Year pe dtfp Country Year pe dtfp 
Hungary 1994 0.526  Slovakia 1994 0.732  
 1995 0.541 1.097   1995 0.773 1.514 
 1996 0.483 1.004   1996 0.719 1.622 
 1997 0.470 1.014   1997 0.734 1.125 
 1998 0.623 1.235   1998 0.751 1.011 
 1999 0.792 1.107   1999 0.765 0.876 
 2000 0.753 0.981   2000 0.578 1.136 
 2001 0.692 1.301   2001 0.534 1.299 
 2002 0.661 1.161   2002 0.656 1.237 
 2003 0.653 1.315   2003 0.696 1.296 
 2004 0.658 1.215   2004 0.718 1.150 
 2005 0.701 1.182   2005 0.785 0.924 
  Average 0.629 1.147    Average 0.703 1.199 
Latvia 1994 0.737  Slovenia 1994 0.580  
 1995 0.836 1.077   1995 0.676 0.985 
 1996 0.821 1.039   1996 0.670 1.107 
 1997 0.667 1.079   1997 0.605 1.030 
 1998 0.578 1.179   1998 0.617 1.007 
 1999 0.424 1.183   1999 0.619 1.184 
 2000 0.528 1.128   2000 0.731 0.972 
 2001 0.570 0.899   2001 0.638 1.160 
 2002 0.623 1.170   2002 0.664 1.155 
 2003 0.637 1.172   2003 0.596 1.093 
 2004 0.707 1.133   2004 0.748 1.009 
 2005 0.557 0.945   2005 0.823 1.136 
   Average 0.640 1.091    Average 0.664 1.076 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3  
Yearly estimates of banking industry competition             
Year          Bulgaria
Czech  
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia
1994 0.181 0.591 0.731 0.224 0.413 1.158 0.762 -0.044 0.534 1.097 
1995           0.245 0.601 0.589 0.382 0.416 0.900 0.775 -0.031 0.498 1.005
1996           0.169 0.500 0.670 0.317 0.713 1.147 0.888 0.153 0.445 0.901
1997           0.187 0.366 0.703 0.328 0.846 1.114 0.742 0.236 0.396 0.970
1998           0.183 0.437 0.684 0.449 0.683 1.134 0.754 0.279 0.412 0.977
1999           0.259 0.414 0.801 0.366 0.756 1.138 0.723 0.381 0.419 1.077
2000           0.293 0.577 0.861 0.419 0.671 1.098 0.742 0.328 0.373 1.067
2001           0.349 0.369 0.887 0.377 0.629 1.134 0.742 0.236 0.321 1.008
2002           0.210 0.651 0.936 0.473 0.832 1.163 0.771 0.293 0.284 1.012
2003           0.347 0.653 0.853 0.481 0.773 1.101 0.800 0.382 0.322 0.996
2004           0.378 0.676 0.700 0.563 0.839 1.161 0.675 0.322 0.356 1.083
2005           0.340 0.617 0.646 0.549 0.830 1.107 0.636 0.293 0.287 0.991
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
ebrd 0.233 8.02 0.184 3.36 -1.170 -2.28
ref94 0.157 2.82 0.046 0.17 -0.018 -0.12
ref95 -0.134 -1.09 -0.317 -1.01 -0.129 -1.68
ref97 0.235 5.67 0.238 0.81 -0.181 -2.19
ref98 -0.111 -2.36 0.163 0.50 -0.009 -0.05
ref99 -0.020 -0.81 -0.010 -0.05 0.071 0.38
ref00 0.076 2.07 0.341 1.16 -0.103 -1.57
ref01 -0.050 -1.93 0.055 0.18 0.012 0.06
ref02 -0.022 -0.68 -0.111 -0.34 -0.107 -1.44
ref03 0.210 2.79 0.670 0.75 -0.136 -1.91
ref04 0.052 1.72 1.171 2.48 -0.182 -2.30
ref05 0.287 7.86 1.514 2.94 -0.207 -2.91
te
ldtfp
mp -0.379 -4.95 -0.463 -6.32 2.539 3.57 2.103 3.11
cap 0.201 3.57 0.189 3.32 9.492 9.25 9.209 8.79
lq -0.408 -10.26 -0.375 -9.36 -2.346 -3.21 -1.967 -2.71
cr -0.018 -3.59 -0.019 -3.73 0.122 1.21 0.139 1.35
dmp 0.510 0.61 0.119 0.15
dcap 1.096 2.54 1.168 1.63
dlq -2.254 -4.31 -2.491 -4.78
dcr -1.722 -28.66 -1.732 -28.62
ir 0.003 2.33 0.004 2.87 -0.026 -2.12 -0.025 -2.62 -0.033 -1.41 -0.038 -1.59
invgdp 0.004 1.81 0.002 1.05 0.010 0.40 0.001 0.07 -0.040 -1.01 -0.040 -0.98
for 0.002 3.68 0.003 5.99 0.001 0.17 0.005 1.21 -0.025 -2.49 -0.025 -2.47
pub -0.002 -3.28 -0.002 -2.92 -0.006 -1.02 -0.012 -2.01 0.013 1.14 0.017 1.39
cons 0.986 10.75 0.495 4.36 0.679 0.92 0.675 0.71 11.849 5.75 11.137 5.31
Table 4 
Second-stage regression results for bank performance
(5) nim (6) nim(1) pe (2) pe (3) dtfp (4) dtfp
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Figure 1. Relationship between TFP growth and TC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between TFP growth and PTEC 
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